

BOOK I, CHAPTER I

(Draft Outline)

The Non-Inevitability of Communism

Theme: The Communist axis is in profound crisis in the USSR and Red China. In both power centers communism is visibly failing as an economic doctrine, despite the enormous investment of human and material capital. It is also failing inwardly as a political faith, and most conspicuously in the USSR and elsewhere in the Eastern European satellite system. Its grip on the intellectuals and managerial elite - the true children and grandchildren of the Marxist-Leninist Revolution - is loosening up. The world struggle is therefore entering a new phase. While the USSR and Red China continue to press the cold war in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the case for communism is faltering at the Red Rones.

Development: The chapter will take up nine major elements:

1. We intend to open with a description and analysis of Khrushchev's Secret Speech of 1956. This was the speech, soon disclosed to the rest of the world, in which Khrushchev revealed the scope and depth of the Stalinist Terror and promised a return to Soviet "legality." The practical effect of the disclosure was to uncork the communist bottle.
2. First reactions to the disclosure. A shock that went through the communist world. Togliatti in Italy called for a "Leninist interpretation" of the proposed de-Stalinization program. Mao promised

that "one hundred flowers" would bloom.

3. The uprisings in Poland and Hungary. The decision to send in the Red Army and the desperate and momentarily successful attempt to recork the bottle.

4. The deepening economic crisis, first in Red China and then in Russia. A brief analysis of the state of things in Russia and China, and the apparent reason for the failures, especially in agriculture.

5. The moral failure. A summary of various reports on the state of mind of the Soviet intelligentsia.

6. The situation - economic and political - in the satellites.

7. The internal struggle over how the crisis is to be mastered. In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev's isolation of the Stalinists (the "Anti-Party" people). The retreat in Red China. The Sino-Soviet split.

8. Khrushchev cannot ram the cork back into the bottle. The difference between this crisis and the earlier ones which Stalin controlled by mass murders, by the arrest or deportation of millions, by walling off the Soviet people from the world and from one another.

9. What the new situation means for the West. Since it is our intention to reserve the last chapter of the book for a discussion of the lines of action which the West might, in our judgment, most profitably pursue, we shall suggest here only that the struggle has taken a much more favorable turn than seemed likely after the first Sputnik. Quite likely, in the Churchillian term, the end of the beginning of that struggle is in sight. The doctrinal thrust is ebbing; the case for world communism directed from the Soviet Union has been exposed as fraudulent. Nevertheless, great power remains dangerously

in the hands of dictators. Heretofore we have visualized the struggle
in terms of decades. Some thought it would provide the equivalent of
a second Hundred Years War. The evidence now is that the climax may
come in the near future.

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